Introduction
Major media agencies and experts have repeatedly failed to provide readers with a clear interpretation of what happened, despite the fact that Sam Bankman-cryptocurrency Fried’s venture was revealed as a hoax in recent weeks. August publications have made several significant revelations on the incident, but they have also frequently appeared to downplay those revelations in ways that minimized Fried’s and Bankman’s guilt.
The listed Fraud.
It is clear that what happened at the FTX cryptocurrency exchange and the hedge fund Alameda Research involved several intentional and deliberate fraud efforts intended to defraud both investors and users of their money. Therefore, a recent New York Times interview came under fire for appearing to attribute FTX’s demise to bad management rather than criminal activities. A Wall Street Journal article has deplored the loss of FTX’s charitable donations, presumably validating Fried’s strategic philanthropy Bankman-pretensions.
Vox co-founder Matthew Yglesias, a court chronicler of the neoliberal status quo, sought to conceal his personal involvements while avoiding the idea that the Bankman-funds Fried’s were truly embezzled by attributing them to helping Democrats in the 2020 elections.
The most outrageous element of this is that some media outlets have referred to what happened at FTX as a “bank run” or a “run on deposits,” despite Bankman-repeated Fried’s claim that the business was simply overleveraged and poorly managed. Both of these attempts to cast blame for the consequences obfuscate the real problem, which is the misappropriation of client monies. Banks are vulnerable to “bank runs” since they are obviously in the business of lending client money out to generate profits. They could momentarily run out of money if everyone withdraws at once, but there won’t be any long-term problems.
Although not banks, FTX, and other cryptocurrency exchanges are not. Since they don’t (or shouldn’t) participate in lending, even a very sudden increase in withdrawals shouldn’t generate a liquidity squeeze.
Customers were clearly guaranteed that the firm would never lend out or otherwise use the bitcoin when they committed it to the FTX exchange.
Actually, the funds were moved to the affiliated trading firm Alameda Research, where it seems they were just thrown away. Simply said, this is theft on a level that is practically unheard of. Even though the total losses have not yet been determined, a bankruptcy filing claims that up to one million consumers might be impacted.
A large number of further decisions and activities that, even in the absence of crypto-specific legislation, would have been regarded as financial fraud if FTX had been a U.S.-regulated firm have been uncovered in less than a month as a result of reporting and the bankruptcy process.
These schemes are nonetheless subject to legal action in U.S. courts to the extent that they made it possible for American people’s property to be effectively stolen.
Their many crimes.
1. The link to Alameda
The connections between Bankman-hedge Fried’s fund, Alameda Research, and FTX, the exchange that attracted ordinary speculators, are at the center of his deception. Unlike an exchange, which eventually makes money from transaction fees on assets owned by users, a hedge fund like Alameda seeks to make money by actively trading or investing funds it controls.
2. The FTT print and ‘collateralized’ loans
The majority of the FTX exchange token, FTT, which FTX and Alameda held, was produced by FTX, but only a small piece of it was traded on open markets. As a result, their holdings were practically illiquid and couldn’t be sold for the open market price. In spite of this, Bankman-Fried recorded its worth at that false market value.
3. Margin liquidation exemption for Alameda Research
According to legal documents submitted by the new CEO overseeing FTX’s bankruptcy and liquidation, Alameda Research was said to have special user status on the platform, including a “hidden exemption” from the platform’s liquidation and margin trading restrictions.
4. Alameda leading the FTX lists
According to the crypto analytics company Argus, Strong evidence suggests that Alameda Research had access to knowledge regarding FTX’s plans to sell certain coins. Alameda was able to buy significant quantities of these tokens ahead of the listing and subsequently sell them since an exchange listing often has a beneficial effect on a token’s price.
5. Executive personal loans of a large amount
FTX officials are said to have received loans totaling $4.1 billion from Alameda Research, including substantial personal loans that were likely unsecured. According to documents from bankruptcy proceedings, Bankman-Fried received a staggering $1 billion in personal loans as well as a $2.3 billion loan to a firm called Paper Bird in which he had a 75% ownership interest. Director of engineering Nishad Singh received a $543 million loan, while co-CEO of FTX Digital Markets Ryan Salame received a $55 million personal loan.
And the list goes on…
